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Episode #956 Quiz

The Inside Tracks
Date: 2024-01-09 | Length: 1.75 hrs | Episode page at twit.tv

About this episode

Apple’s A12-A16 SoC backdoor appears deliberate, intended as an emergency-only unlock Apple can still reenable via updates, though leaked access now weakens plausible deniability and invites law-enforcement demands. Ukraine’s telecom attacks show destructive cyberwar targeting cameras and infrastructure. LastPass, 23andMe, crypto, and Google incidents highlight credential theft, key compromise, and poor security hygiene.

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Question 1: According to Steve's explanation of Apple's silicon backdoor, what most likely explains why Apple built it in at all?

Question 1

According to Steve's explanation of Apple's silicon backdoor, what most likely explains why Apple built it in at all?

To allow law enforcement agencies to use it through normal court-order workflows To support error correction by storing an ECC table in the GPU's SBox To provide Apple a last-resort way to unlock devices under dire circumstances To let carrier partners bypass passcodes for routine customer support

Question 2: What concrete effect did the Ukrainian telecom attack have beyond the initial outage of Kyivstar services?

Question 2

What concrete effect did the Ukrainian telecom attack have beyond the initial outage of Kyivstar services?

It permanently disabled Ukraine's national mobile network for all subscribers It caused only a brief login issue with no broader infrastructure impact It disrupted ATMs and some regional air-raid sirens that depended on Kyivstar connectivity It exposed only billing records while leaving operational services untouched

Question 3: In Steve's summary of the 23andMe breach, what was the unusual scale of access obtained through the logged-in-user API?

Question 3

In Steve's summary of the 23andMe breach, what was the unusual scale of access obtained through the logged-in-user API?

Each compromised account could reach only its own profile and no other users' data Each compromised account could reach about 493 other members' data on average Each compromised account could reach exactly 14,000 other members' data on average Each compromised account could reach the full database only after bypassing MFA

Question 4: What did the New Jersey Merck insurance dispute specifically hinge on in relation to cyberattacks?

Question 4

What did the New Jersey Merck insurance dispute specifically hinge on in relation to cyberattacks?

Whether state law required the insurers to cover only physical destruction from malware Whether Merck's claim should be denied because it lacked cyberattack insurance entirely Whether ransomware damages counted as routine maintenance under the policy Whether a cyberattack fit the policy exclusion for hostile or warlike action

Question 5: What operational guidance did Steve ultimately give about SpinRite 6.1 and virtual machines?

Question 5

What operational guidance did Steve ultimately give about SpinRite 6.1 and virtual machines?

It should be run in any VM as long as the ISO is attached as a virtual CD It should be run only on SSDs because spinners no longer behave predictably It should be run only after enabling Startup Boost in Edge It should run only on real hardware, not inside an emulated VM

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