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Episode #948 Quiz

What if a Bit Flipped?
Date: 2023-11-14 | Length: 1.75 hrs | Episode page at twit.tv

About this episode

Privacy Badger and uBlock Origin together blocked tracking widgets and analytics domains, while eIDAS 2.0 Article 45 would let member states install trusted certificates for transparent HTTPS interception. Intel’s Downfall microcode update blocks Gather-based speculative leaks, but may cost up to 50% performance. SSH RSA faults can expose private keys.

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Question 1: What was the practical effect of Intel's Downfall microcode update on Gather instruction behavior, according to the episode?

Question 1

What was the practical effect of Intel's Downfall microcode update on Gather instruction behavior, according to the episode?

It blocks transient results of Gather and prevents observing speculative Gather data It encrypts vector register contents so speculative loads cannot leak It replaces Gather with a software emulation path in the operating system It disables all speculative execution and serializes every branch

Question 2: Why did the iotaseed.io seed-phrase generator site lead to theft of wallet funds?

Question 2

Why did the iotaseed.io seed-phrase generator site lead to theft of wallet funds?

It generated phrases that were weak enough to be brute-forced offline It secretly stored every suggested seed phrase and later used them to break into wallets It intercepted blockchain transactions and redirected wallet balances It exploited a flaw in IOTA's consensus protocol to drain wallets

Question 3: In the episode's explanation of the root store and certificate trust, what enables a man-in-the-middle appliance to decrypt a user's HTTPS traffic without browser warnings?

Question 3

In the episode's explanation of the root store and certificate trust, what enables a man-in-the-middle appliance to decrypt a user's HTTPS traffic without browser warnings?

It bypasses certificate validation by manipulating DNS responses only It steals the server's private key during the initial certificate exchange It presents a certificate signed by a CA already trusted in the browser's root store It downgrades the connection to plain HTTP after the TLS handshake

Question 4: What scale of key compromise did the UC San Diego researchers report from passive SSH/IKE analysis in the episode?

Question 4

What scale of key compromise did the UC San Diego researchers report from passive SSH/IKE analysis in the episode?

They recovered private keys for 590,000 unique SSH hosts They recovered private keys for 4,900 unique RSA public keys They recovered private keys for 189 unique RSA public keys They recovered private keys for 189 unique Ed25519 public keys

Question 5: How did Steve characterize the best practical response to the quantum threat against asymmetric crypto?

Question 5

How did Steve characterize the best practical response to the quantum threat against asymmetric crypto?

Rely on longer RSA keys because bigger moduli neutralize Shor's algorithm Abandon public-key crypto entirely and return to only pre-shared symmetric keys Move to quantum-safe replacements through browser and application ecosystem enforcement Wait until quantum computers can already break RSA before planning migration

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