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Episode #873 Quiz

DuckDuckGone?
Date: 2022-05-31 | Length: 1.75 hrs | Episode page at twit.tv

About this episode

Australia’s NSW Digital Driver’s License stored encrypted JSON with AES-256-CBC, but the key was only a four-digit PIN, enabling brute-force decryption, tampering, and re-encryption from backups without signatures or server validation. Microsoft Office’s Follina abused ms-msdt protocol handling for remote code execution. Ghost Touch injected capacitive touch events via EMI.

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Question 1: What key weakness in the New South Wales Digital Driver's License made offline tampering feasible after an attacker obtained the stored data?

Question 1

What key weakness in the New South Wales Digital Driver's License made offline tampering feasible after an attacker obtained the stored data?

The license data was protected by a server-side OTP that could be replayed locally. The license data was stored in plaintext because iOS backups removed all encryption. The license data was signed with a short-lived certificate that expired too quickly. The license data was encrypted with a four-digit PIN and no key derivation.

Question 2: Why did the Dvuln researchers say the DDL application's pull-to-refresh feature did not actually protect against a modified license display?

Question 2

Why did the Dvuln researchers say the DDL application's pull-to-refresh feature did not actually protect against a modified license display?

It required a network connection that was unavailable on the device. It overwrote the local data with a cached copy from another app. It reissued the entire license from the server, but with a stale timestamp. It refreshed only the QR code, not the main displayed identity fields.

Question 3: What was the exact reason Microsoft MSRC gave for closing the April 12 Follina report on April 21?

Question 3

What was the exact reason Microsoft MSRC gave for closing the April 12 Follina report on April 21?

It required a passcode when started, and the sample's passcode did not work. It only affected unsupported versions of Office that were no longer receiving patches. It was blocked by Protected View in every supported document-opening path. It depended on macros being enabled, so it was not considered a security issue.

Question 4: According to the Ghost Touch research summarized in the episode, what technique did the attackers use to generate fake touchscreen input?

Question 4

According to the Ghost Touch research summarized in the episode, what technique did the attackers use to generate fake touchscreen input?

Ultrasonic vibrations resonated with the touch sensor to mimic finger pressure. Electromagnetic interference injected taps and swipes into the capacitive panel. Laser pulses altered the screen controller's calibration and produced false coordinates. Bluetooth packets triggered a hidden accessibility service on the target device.

Question 5: What was the specific contractual limitation DuckDuckGo said prevented its browser from fully blocking Microsoft-owned trackers on third-party sites?

Question 5

What was the specific contractual limitation DuckDuckGo said prevented its browser from fully blocking Microsoft-owned trackers on third-party sites?

Its Microsoft search syndication agreement restricted completely stopping Microsoft scripts from loading. Its privacy policy prohibited blocking any scripts that originated from search results pages. Its browser engine lacked any API for blocking third-party JavaScript from other domains. Its Android app store listing required it to permit Bing scripts for compliance testing.

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