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Episode #844 Quiz

Bluetooth Fingerprinting
Date: 2021-11-09 | Length: 1.75 hrs | Episode page at twit.tv

About this episode

Researchers from UCSD showed BLE beaconing mobile devices can be fingerprinted by physical-layer imperfections such as carrier frequency and modulation offsets, despite MAC rotation and cryptographic anonymity. Their SDR-based toolkit tracked phones in crowded environments, though reliability varied with chipset, power, temperature, and receiver quality. Passive deanonymization remains feasible.

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Question 1: According to the episode, what specific GitLab flaw was being exploited to build botnets that generated terabit-per-second DDoS traffic?

Question 1

According to the episode, what specific GitLab flaw was being exploited to build botnets that generated terabit-per-second DDoS traffic?

CVE-2021-22205 in ExifTool handling of DjVu uploads CVE-2021-1048 in the Android kernel use-after-free path A certificate-expiration problem in Windows 11 signed apps A hard-coded SSH key in Cisco Policy Suite

Question 2: What did the attacker-controlled npm packages 'coa' and 'rc' do after the malicious post-install script ran on Windows systems?

Question 2

What did the attacker-controlled npm packages 'coa' and 'rc' do after the malicious post-install script ran on Windows systems?

They launched a browser exploit against Chromium-based clients They encrypted user files and displayed a ransom note They downloaded and executed a DLL containing Qakbot malware They disabled Defender and created a new local admin account

Question 3: In the SpinRite debugging story, what mismatch caused the hard hang on the affected controller?

Question 3

In the SpinRite debugging story, what mismatch caused the hard hang on the affected controller?

The drive signaled IRQ 0 while the controller expected IRQ 1 The BIOS failed to report any IRQ and the drive used polling only The BIOS reported IRQ 5 while the hardware actually signaled IRQ 11 The BIOS reported IRQ 11 while the hardware actually signaled IRQ 5

Question 4: How did the UCSD Bluetooth study's proof-of-concept tracking attack identify the target device before training the classifier?

Question 4

How did the UCSD Bluetooth study's proof-of-concept tracking attack identify the target device before training the classifier?

It extracted the public key from the device's contact-tracing app It used the IMEI from the device's cellular broadcasts It captured the SSID from the device's Wi-Fi hotspot It recorded the MAC address of the nearest BLE device during a close-range scan

Question 5: What mitigation did Microsoft recommend for the Windows 11 Snipping Tool issue when the certificate problem prevented it from opening?

Question 5

What mitigation did Microsoft recommend for the Windows 11 Snipping Tool issue when the certificate problem prevented it from opening?

Use the Print Screen key and paste the screenshot into Paint or a document Reissue the app's signing certificate with a longer expiration date Roll back the system clock to October 30th before launching the app Install the preview patch KB4006746 from Windows Update

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