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Episode #812 Quiz

GIT Me Some PHP
Date: 2021-03-30 | Length: 1.5 hrs | Episode page at twit.tv

About this episode

ProxyLogon remediation still left tens of thousands of Exchange servers exposed. Linux patches closed two Spectre bypasses in kernel/bpf/verifier.c, enabling speculative out-of-bounds reads via eBPF and browser JavaScript. OpenSSL 1.1.1k fixed a renegotiation NULL dereference DoS and a strict-verification CA chain bypass. PHP moved Git to GitHub with mandatory two-factor authentication.

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Question 1: According to the episode, what was the current estimate of Exchange Server instances still vulnerable to ProxyLogon after the early March patching push?

Question 1

According to the episode, what was the current estimate of Exchange Server instances still vulnerable to ProxyLogon after the early March patching push?

4,300 instances 300,000 instances 29,966 instances 92,072 instances

Question 2: What capability did the Linux Spectre bypasses described in the episode allow malicious code to obtain from affected systems?

Question 2

What capability did the Linux Spectre bypasses described in the episode allow malicious code to obtain from affected systems?

Firmware settings from the boot ROM Sensitive information from kernel memory User credentials from the browser cache TLS session keys from OpenSSL servers

Question 3: Under what condition could the OpenSSL issue CVE-2021-3449 crash a server, according to the advisory quoted in the episode?

Question 3

Under what condition could the OpenSSL issue CVE-2021-3449 crash a server, according to the advisory quoted in the episode?

A TLS v1.2 renegotiation ClientHello omits signature_algorithms but includes signature_algorithms_cert A client sends an expired certificate chain during session resumption A server receives an unrecognized cipher suite in the initial handshake A TLS v1.3 ClientHello includes a malformed key_share extension

Question 4: What did the malicious PHP Git commit actually do when the HTTP user-agent string began with the trigger value?

Question 4

What did the malicious PHP Git commit actually do when the HTTP user-agent string began with the trigger value?

It wrote the remainder into a log file for later review It passed the remainder into PHP's eval function It encrypted the remainder with a hard-coded key It compared the remainder against a fixed whitelist of commands

Question 5: What operational change did the PHP project announce after the Git server compromise?

Question 5

What operational change did the PHP project announce after the Git server compromise?

Only signed releases would be accepted from now on Write access would be limited to PHP core developers by email approval GitHub mirrors would become the canonical repositories The project would move all repositories to a private self-hosted replacement

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