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Episode #803 Quiz

Comparative Smartphone Security
Date: 2021-01-26 | Length: 2 hrs | Episode page at twit.tv

About this episode

Chrome 88 and Edge 88 expand built-in password management with weak-password checks, editing, generation, and breach detection, but stored secrets remain decryptable while the browser is logged in. The episode also details Flash’s hard shutdown failures, DDoS-extortion ransomware, SolarWinds tradecraft, and smartphone security tradeoffs in iOS and Android, especially cloud backups.

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Question 1: According to the episode, what specifically allowed Chrome 88 users to identify a weak password from the browser's password check without that finding necessarily indicating a real exposed credential?

Question 1

According to the episode, what specifically allowed Chrome 88 users to identify a weak password from the browser's password check without that finding necessarily indicating a real exposed credential?

The password was flagged because Chrome compared it against local username popularity data The password was flagged because Edge had already reported it in a shared breach list The password was a deliberate honeypot entry left weak on purpose The password was flagged because it matched the browser's built-in password generator template

Question 2: In the SolarWinds follow-up analysis, what mechanism did Microsoft describe for separating the second-stage Cobalt Strike execution from the original SolarWinds process?

Question 2

In the SolarWinds follow-up analysis, what mechanism did Microsoft describe for separating the second-stage Cobalt Strike execution from the original SolarWinds process?

A kernel driver that hooked process creation and redirected execution into memory A scheduled task that directly launched the loader from a hidden PowerShell script A browser add-on that injected the loader after the first DNS callback An IFEO Debugger registry value that caused dllhost.exe to launch wscript.exe and then rundll.exe

Question 3: What did Microsoft say the SolarWinds attackers did immediately after running noisy network reconnaissance to reduce the chance of detection?

Question 3

What did Microsoft say the SolarWinds attackers did immediately after running noisy network reconnaissance to reduce the chance of detection?

They deleted the entire Cobalt Strike implant from disk and started over They removed the temporary firewall rules they had added for the reconnaissance They disabled HTTPS to force all command traffic onto unencrypted ports They switched the target machine to an offline maintenance network

Question 4: According to the Johns Hopkins analysis summarized in the episode, what was the key Android encryption limitation for devices that had already been unlocked once?

Question 4

According to the Johns Hopkins analysis summarized in the episode, what was the key Android encryption limitation for devices that had already been unlocked once?

Decryption keys were erased immediately whenever the phone connected to Wi-Fi Decryption keys were stored only in the cloud and never on the device Decryption keys remained in memory at all times after first unlock Decryption keys were regenerated only after every screen lock event

Question 5: What did the episode say about the relationship between iCloud backup and Apple services' end-to-end encryption claims?

Question 5

What did the episode say about the relationship between iCloud backup and Apple services' end-to-end encryption claims?

Some end-to-end encrypted services are undermined when used together with iCloud backup iCloud backup always preserves end-to-end encryption with no exceptions Apple's documentation clearly separates every encrypted service from every Apple-accessible service Only messages are encrypted end-to-end, so backups cannot affect anything else

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