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Episode #802 Quiz

Where the Plaintext Is
Date: 2021-01-19 | Length: 1.5 hrs | Episode page at twit.tv

About this episode

Google restricted Chrome sync APIs to Chrome only, removing third-party Chromium access to private account data. Project Zero analyzed a watering-hole campaign using iframe-delivered renderer exploits, sandbox escapes, and Android post-exploitation, emphasizing root-cause analysis. Microsoft patched Defender RCE, prepared Zerologon enforcement, and NSA urged enterprise-controlled DoH. Titan keys were cloned via electromagnetic ECDSA leakage.

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Question 1: According to the Project Zero analysis described in the episode, what combination of exploit chains did the attackers use against Windows users before the exploit servers were taken down?

Question 1

According to the Project Zero analysis described in the episode, what combination of exploit chains did the attackers use against Windows users before the exploit servers were taken down?

An SCTP protocol exploit followed by a Chromium sync API abuse A Windows kernel exploit followed by a Microsoft Defender payload dropper An Android privilege escalation followed by a Chrome browser extension exploit A Chrome renderer exploit followed by two Windows sandbox escapes

Question 2: What did Google say it was going to do on March 15 regarding Chrome sync access from third-party Chromium-based browsers?

Question 2

What did Google say it was going to do on March 15 regarding Chrome sync access from third-party Chromium-based browsers?

Block third-party browsers from using the Chrome sync API Disable Chrome sync for all Chrome users until sync privacy settings are reviewed Require third-party browsers to reauthenticate through Google Takeout Migrate all Chrome sync data into Chromium by default

Question 3: In the NSA's advisory on encrypted DNS in enterprise environments, what was the recommended stance toward external DoH resolvers?

Question 3

In the NSA's advisory on encrypted DNS in enterprise environments, what was the recommended stance toward external DoH resolvers?

Permit any DoH resolver as long as DNS responses are cached locally Allow only the enterprise resolver and block all other encrypted DNS resolvers Prefer external DoH resolvers for privacy and disable the internal resolver Allow external DoH resolvers only for mobile devices and guests

Question 4: What was the key recovery result reported by NinjaLab for the Google Titan Security Key attack?

Question 4

What was the key recovery result reported by NinjaLab for the Google Titan Security Key attack?

4,000 RF samples recovered the Titan key's long-term RSA private key 6,000 electromagnetic observations recovered the Titan key's long-term ECDSA private key 6,000 power traces recovered the Titan key's public key material 4,000 timing traces recovered the Titan key's short-term session key

Question 5: What was the final point Steve made with the phrase 'Where the plaintext is'?

Question 5

What was the final point Steve made with the phrase 'Where the plaintext is'?

Attackers should target keystrokes and endpoints rather than encrypted traffic Metadata is safer than message content because it is never monetized Encrypted messaging is always broken by weaker cipher suites Public key cryptography prevents all forms of endpoint compromise

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